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CHOOSING A BETTER PATH: THE MISGUIDED
APPEAL OF INCREASED CRIMINAL LIABILITY
AFTER DEEPWATER HORIZON
JOSHUA FERSHEE*
INTRODUCTION
When the Deepwater Horizon oil rig exploded on April 20, 2010,
eleven people died and the first of 4.9 billion gallons of oil started spilling
into the Gulf of Mexico.1 The result was “an unprecedented crisis and
response”2 and what has been dubbed “the worst environmental disaster
in U.S. history.”3 The blowout of the Macondo well4 required “more than
47,000 personnel; 7,000 vessels; 120 aircraft; and the participation of scores
of federal, state, and local agencies” to address the disaster.5
Blame for the explosion and its aftermath has been cast broadly,
with BP, Transocean, and Halliburton listed as the primary culprits.6 It has
been said that these companies, through their executives, chose profits over
worker safety and the environment.7 While there may be some truth to that
sentiment, it is not the full story. Without considering the externalities of
the oil spill, such as the devastating harm to the environment and loss of
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University of North Dakota School of Law. This article reflects the views and analysis of
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1 RAY MABUS, SEC’Y OF THE NAVY, AMERICA’S GULF COAST: A LONG TERM RECOVERY PLAN
AFTER THE DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL 2 (Sept. 2010).
2 Id.
3 David M. Uhlmann, After the Spill Is Gone: The Gulf of Mexico, Environmental Crime,
and the Criminal Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1413–14 (2011).
4 NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING,
DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING, REPORT
TO THE PRESIDENT 1 (2011), available at http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default
/files/documents/DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter REPORT
TO THE PRESIDENT].
5 MABUS, supra note 1, at 2.
6 See Brian Montopoli, Obama Slams BP, Transocean, Halliburton Over Gulf Oil Spill, CBS
NEWS (May 14, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20005013-503544.html.
7 See Laurel Brubaker Calkins & Allen M. Johnson, Jr., Mississippi AG Asks Judge to
Oversee Feinberg, PRESS-REGISTER (Mobile, AL), Jan. 26, 2011, at C8.
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income and livelihood for those in the region,8 the direct and immediate
economic harm to BP should have led the company to enact policies to pro-
tect against such a disaster. At $80.37 per barrel, the 4.9 million barrels of
oil that polluted the Gulf of Mexico amounts to approximately $393,813,000
in lost revenue.9 As such, even if one were to believe that BP executives
truly did not care about harm to people or the environment, their interest
in money should have led to actions designed to protect against this kind
of loss. Add in the costs of clean-up, which could cost BP approximately $20
billion,10 and pure financial self-interest should have been a strong moti-
vator for safer drilling and operations. Unfortunately, it was not.
So what led to this failure? There is not a single cause, but there
is little doubt that regulatory oversight failed and corporate oversight
failed. The National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
and Offshore Drilling called the blowout “a failure of management” and de-
termined the “cumulative risk . . . large and avoidable.”11 The Commission
explained:
The blowout was not the product of a series of aberrational
decisions made by rogue industry or government officials
that could not have been anticipated or expected to occur
again. Rather, the root causes are systemic and, absent sig-
nificant reform in both industry practices and government
policies, might well recur.12
In addition to calls for regulatory reform13 and legislative repeal
of liability caps in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990,14 outrage over the spill
8 Elizabeth Weises & Doyle Rice, How Bad Could BP Oil Spill Get for the Gulf and the
Nation?, USA TODAY (June 9, 2010), http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/environment
/2010-06-09-1Aoilhowbad09_CV_N.htm.
9 See Joel Achenbach and David A. Farhrenthold, Oil Spill Dumped 4.9 Million Barrels
into Gulf, Latest Measure Shows, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/02/AR2010080204695.html; BLOOMBERG, MARKETS,
ENERGY & OIL PRICES (Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/energy/. Oil calculation
provided is based on oil prices from September 28, 2011.
10 See Calkins & Johnson, supra note 7, at C8.
11 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 4, at 90, 115.
12 Id. at 122.
13 See Charles B. Anderson & Colin de la Rue, The Role of P&I Clubs in Marine Pollution
Incidents, 85 TUL. L. REV. 1257, 1267–68 (2011).
14 See, e.g., Consolidated Land, Energy, and Aquatic Resources (CLEAR) Act, H.R. 3534,
111th Cong. §§ 702–03 (2010) (proposing to remove the $75 million cap for offshore
drillers’ liability).
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has led some to call for broad and aggressive pursuit of criminal charges
to punish those responsible for the spill and act as a prophylactic measure
against future disasters.15 Some have argued for laws that would make
it easier to prosecute companies and their executives for environmental
disasters, and others have even argued for the imposition of strict criminal
liability to help ensure that such a disaster never happens again.16
Despite the potential appeal of dramatically increased liability and
higher sentences, and perhaps even strict criminal liability (which means
that no proof of intent is necessary to convict), this Article argues that more
aggressive criminal provisions and enforcement related to environmental
harms, up to and including strict criminal liability, are not likely to protect
the environment better or lead to safer work environments. Part I of this
Article will consider the history and legality of, and the rationale behind,
policies designed to make it easier to convict allegedly responsible parties.
This Part uses strict liability in U.S. criminal law to provide a framework
for considering when and how aggressive increases in criminal liability
have and could be used in environmental law, and the expected value
from such efforts. This Part also discusses the pursuit of increased liability
in relation to disaster-related and tragedy-related events in the financial
and criminal sectors. Part II will discuss the use of reduced burdens and
strict liability in environmental law in both civil and criminal contexts.
Additionally, it will argue that the use of strict liability is less effective
than a negligence standard because it tends to reduce penalties, which
can limit the direct punishment to violators, as well as the prophylactic
potential of the laws. Finally, this Article concludes that, rather than reduc-
ing mens rea standards and increasing criminal liability, U.S. energy and
environmental law needs to focus on encouraging proper risk assessment
15 Uhlmann, supra note 3, at 1413 (“The Justice Department should bring criminal
charges based on the Gulf oil spill, because a criminal prosecution will deter future spills
better than civil penalties alone and will express societal condemnation of the negligence
that caused the spill in ways that civil enforcement cannot.”).
16 Rob Holtom, Should Ecocide Be a Crime of Strict Liability?, WILD LAW UK BLOG (May 25,
2001), http://www.wildlawuk.org/1/post/2011/05/should-ecocide-be-a-crime-of-strict-liability
.html (“It was a fascinating and hard-hitting debate. As for the vote: Polly—approx 35,
David—4. Clearly people agreed that Ecocide is just too devastating, too disastrous, too
tragic, for it not to be a crime of strict liability.”); cf. Jane F. Barrett, Editorial, BP Executives
Should Go to Jail, BALT. SUN, July 1, 2010, at 19A (stating that current strict liability
crimes are “only punishable by 12 months or less imprisonment per count, [but] a judge
in [the BP] case might be convinced to impose consecutive rather than concurrent jail
terms for each one”).
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and risk management to promote safe and effective energy extraction and
production while encouraging and protecting both the environment and
the economy.
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF REDUCED OR ELIMINATED MENS REA
REQUIREMENT PENALTIES
When something terrible happens, the natural response is to seek
the perpetrators and punish them to the greatest extent possible. This
sometimes involves pursuing obscure, little-used, or tenuously connected
laws to increase the likelihood of punishment.17 When punishment is not
available or deemed inadequate, the response is often to seek legislative or
regulatory changes, or a combination of the two, to increase the likelihood
that a future offender will be punished.18 The response is to pursue options
that reduce or eliminate the mens rea requirement (the requisite state of
mind the prosecution must prove to convict);19 the broadest such option
is strict liability.20
A. The Nuclear Option: Strict Liability
Strict liability is often considered a modern concept that was his-
torically unknown in criminal situations.21 While the seemingly prevail-
ing opinion is that strict liability first began to appear in the last half of
the nineteenth century, commentators have noted that the felony murder
17 See Barrett, supra note 16, at 19A (“[The government] must do nothing less than pursue
criminal prosecutions of responsible individuals under every supportable theory.”).
18 See Katherine H. Setness, Statutory Interpretation of Clean Water Act Section
1319(C)(2)(A)’s Knowledge Requirement: Reconciling the Needs of Environmental and
Criminal Law, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 447, 460 (1996).
19 See id. at 449 (“Many courts and commentators . . . worry that the pursuit of envi-
ronmental goals threatens to override the criminal law’s traditional requirement that
criminal punishment be predicated on a showing of mens rea.”).
20 See Uhlmann, supra note 3, at 1461 (“Except under strict liability schemes, conduct is
not culpable simply because harm occurs.” (footnotes omitted)).
21 See Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes, 78
CORNELL L. REV. 401, 436 (1993) (stating that common law required mens rea for crimes
until the mid-nineteenth century).
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rule,22 which developed via the common law,23 is hundreds of years old.24
These apparently divergent views are not surprising given that defining
what constitutes a strict liability offense is controversial.
Legal scholars generally agree that strict liability crimes lack a
mens rea requirement.25 Yet even this apparent agreement leads to vastly
differing opinions. Professor Joshua Dressler describes two meanings of
mens rea: “culpability” mens rea and “elemental” mens rea.26 Traditionally,
culpability refers to a “felonious intent” or “guilty knowledge.”27 In contrast,
elemental mens rea “refers to the particular mental state or states provided
in the definition of a particular crime.”28 The elemental mens rea concept
allows for two types of analysis: “offense analysis”—where offenses have
one mens rea requirement—and “element analysis”—where every offense
element may have its own, differing mens rea requirement.29 These differ-
ent methods of analysis can lead to different determinations as to whether
a crime is a strict liability offense at all.30 For instance, under both offense
analysis or culpability mens rea, it can be argued that the felony murder
rule is not strict liability because the mens rea can be traced to the intent
22 “[A]t common law[,] an unintentional homicide was murder if committed in the perpe-
tration of a felony.” State v. Glover, 50 S.W.2d 1049, 1052 (Ma. 1932). Even though the
felony was not dangerous and the “killing of another” an accident, the felony murder rule
made the accidental death a murder. See id.
Similarly, the State of New York finds a defendant has committed a felony murder
if a homicide occurs when, “[a]cting either alone or with . . . other persons, he commits
or attempts to commit [various enumerated crimes] and, in the course of and in further-
ance of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom, he, or another participant . . . causes
the death of a person other than one of the participants. . . .” N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(3)
(Consol. 2001).
23 Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional Innocence, 112 HARV. L. REV. 828, 838 (1999).
24 See Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at
Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446, 449 (1985) (noting that, despite its
age, it is not clear when courts first began imposing the felony murder rule).
25 Michaels, supra note 23, at 830; see also JAMES MARSHALL, INTENTION—IN LAW AND
SOCIETY 138 (1968) (describing the difference between tort liability, which questions only
whether the actor caused the harm, and criminal responsibility, which requires mens rea).
26 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, 102–03 (2d ed. 1995).
27 See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251–52 (1952) (explaining that common
law had required a “vicious will” for criminal culpability).
28 Michaels, supra note 23, at 839.
29 Id.; see also Paul Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal
Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, 683 (1983) (commenting
that the Model Penal Code’s general culpability provisions allow for an offense to have
different mens rea requirements for “each objective element of [that] offense”).
30 Michaels, supra note 23, at 839.
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to commit the felony.31 By contrast, under the “element analysis” approach,
the felony murder rule imposes a measure of strict liability because there
is no requisite intent with respect to the “killing of another”32 element of
the offense.33
While there are numerous varieties of “strict liability” definitions,
for the purpose of this Article, the definition of strict liability will be that
utilized by Professor Alan Michaels: those offenses that lack a mens rea
requirement for one or more material elements.34 This definition provides
Professor Michaels with the starting point for his article discussing the con-
cept of “constitutional innocence.”35 This concept provides one framework
for considering the constitutionality and usefulness of strict criminal lia-
bility in environmental law, particularly as it relates to oil spills.
The principle of constitutional innocence provides that strict liability
is only constitutional when the intentional conduct covered by the statute
could legislatively be made criminal.36 Consequently, strict liability is per-
missible if the Constitution would allow the state to impose criminal lia-
bility under an identical statute without the strict liability element.37 For
instance, felony murder has two elements: (1) the killing of another during
(2) the commission of a crime.38 Following the principle of constitutional
31 Id.
32 See supra note 22 and accompanying text (explaining the contour of the felony murder
rule).
33 See Michaels, supra note 23, at 840 (stating that under elemental analysis, the felony
murder rule “impose[s] strict liability, because the defendant may be convicted regardless
of his or her mental state with respect to a material element of the offense”).
34 See Michaels, supra note 23, at 830; see also JOHN S. BAKER, JR. ET AL., HALL’S CRIMINAL
LAW 691 (5th ed. 1993) (stating that “strict liability offenses requir[e] no specific intent . . .
render[ing] immaterial claims that defendants lacked intent or knowledge”); Sanford H.
Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 257, 267 (1987) (“Strict liability imposes guilt
without regard to whether the defendant knew or reasonably could have known some
relevant feature of the situation.”).
35 See Michaels, supra note 23, at 834.
36 Id.
37 See id. at 835.
38 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:31 (1977). In pertinent part stating:
A. Manslaughter is:
. . . 
(2) A homicide committed, without any intent to cause death or great
bodily harm.
(a) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted
perpetration of any felony not enumerated in [the first degree murder
statute], or of any intentional misdemeanor directly affecting the person.
Id.
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innocence, felony-murder statutes should be constitutional because, in
certain circumstances, the state can make it illegal to ever kill another
person.39 Professor Michaels uses bigamy, which requires the marrying
of another when already married, as an example of a law that probably
cannot, following the principle of constitutional innocence, hold offenders
strictly liable.40 “Because the fundamental right to marry prohibits the
state from” criminalizing all marriages, strict liability with respect to the
“element of already being married” should not be constitutional.41
Though strict liability crimes remain relatively rare, the United
States Supreme Court has allowed strict liability in a number of settings,
and while others have reviewed these cases,42 a little background is
helpful. A key early decision was United States v. Balint, in which the
defendants were charged with failing to record their sales of heroin and
other drugs on a requisite Internal Revenue Service form.43 The Narcotic
Act of December 14, 1914, required that sales of all drugs listed in the act
be recorded on a specific form and that the seller keep that completed form
for two years.44 The defendants argued that they had not committed the
crime because “the indictment . . . failed to charge that they had sold the
inhibited drugs knowing them to be such.”45 The Court held that the stat-
ute did not require knowledge that the seller knew that the drugs sold
required compliance with the Act.46 The seller needed only to know that
the items sold were drugs—such sellers of drugs acted at their “peril” if
they sold an “inhibited drug in ignorance of its character.”47 The seller
did not need to know that the drugs were covered by the statute; the sale
itself could lead to punishment.48 The court stated that “Congress weighed
39 See United States v. Howard, 449 F.2d 1086, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Even, “[i]f by pure
accident a death occurred in the course of [a] robbery the result in law is to make the
offender guilty of first degree felony murder.”); see also Rudolph J. Gerber, On Dispensing
Injustice, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 135, 150 (2001) (“In the felony murder case, evidence of
accident, mistake and mental state is excluded.”). In fact, most states provide for some
exceptions to the rule, recognizing that the felony-murder concept can be unduly harsh.
See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney, 2009) (listing exceptions to the rule).
40 See Michaels, supra note 23, at 835.
41 See id.
42 See, e.g., id. at 842–59.
43 258 U.S. 250, 251 (1922).
44 See id. at 253 n.1.
45 Id. at 251.
46 See id. at 253–54.
47 See id. at 254.
48 See id.
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the possible injustice of subjecting an innocent seller to a penalty against
the evil of exposing innocent purchasers to danger from the drug, and con-
cluded that the latter was the result preferably to be avoided.”49 Thus, such
strict liability crimes were deemed to be constitutionally permissible.50
The next key strict liability case, United States v. Dotterweich,51
involved the interpretation of a vicarious liability provision of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FFDC Act”).52 The Supreme Court deter-
mined that the Act provided for both vicarious liability and strict liability:
The offense is committed . . . by all who do have such a re-
sponsible share in the furtherance of the transaction which
the statute outlaws, namely, to put into the stream of inter-
state commerce adulterated or misbranded drugs. Hardship
there doubtless may be under a statute which thus penal-
izes the transaction though consciousness of wrongdoing
be totally wanting. Balancing relative hardships, Congress
has preferred to place it upon those who have at least the
opportunity of informing themselves of the existence of con-
ditions imposed for the protection of consumers before shar-
ing in illicit commerce, rather than to throw the hazard on
the innocent public who are wholly helpless.53
This case is especially noteworthy because both the dissent and the
majority seem to agree that strict liability crimes are constitutionally
49 Balint, 258 U.S. at 254.
50 See id. In reaching its decision, the Balint Court relied on a case decided twelve years
earlier. See id. at 252. This decision, Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, stated that,
under the police power granted the states by the Constitution, “it may be provided that
he who shall do [certain acts] shall do them at his peril, and will not be heard to plead in
defense good faith or ignorance.” 218 U.S. 57, 70 (1910). While the Shevlin-Carpenter
decision required only that the court decide whether civil strict liability penalties were
constitutionally permissible (it did not involve criminal sanctions), the Court, in dicta, im-
plied that strict liability was permissible in certain situations for both civil and criminal
statutes. See id. at 67–68 (“[I]n a few instances, the public welfare has made it necessary
to declare a crime, irrespective of the actor’s intent.”). The Balint court found this persuasive
and adopted it in the criminal context. Balint, 258 U.S. at 254.
51 320 U.S. 277, 278–80 (1943).
52 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1938).
53 Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 284–85.
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permissible,54 though they disagree with respect to whether or not the
FFDC Act did in fact impose such liability.55
The subsequent case of Morissette v. United States56 is the con-
summate strict liability case, found in casebooks read by a predominance
of first-year law students.57 The Morissette court interpreted the statute
at issue to require intent by the alleged violator, even though the statute
did not expressly state such a requirement.58 While this case is often ref-
erenced as providing a requirement of intent in criminal cases,59 the opinion
states that prior Supreme Court cases upholding criminal strict liability
had the Court’s “approval and adherence for the circumstances to which it
was there applied.”60 Morissette, more accurately, provides that strict lia-
bility has some role in criminal situations, depending upon the crime in
question.61 Because the statute in question adopted common law terms of
art, Morissette stands for the proposition that, absent contrary direction,
it is to be presumed that Congress intended to retain common law elements
of a crime.62 Justice Jackson described situations in which strict liability
crimes were likely appropriate, stating that
whatever the intent of the violator, the injury is the same,
and the consequences are injurious or not according to
fortuity. Hence, legislation applicable to such offenses, as
54 Justice Murphy, in his dissent, stated that “in the absence of clear statutory authorization
it is inconsistent with established canons of criminal law to rest liability on an act in
which the accused did not participate and of which he had no personal knowledge.” Id.
at 286 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Frankfurter, writing for the
majority, noted that with respect to strict liability statutes, “the good sense of prosecutors,
the wise guidance of trial judges, and the ultimate judgment of juries must be trusted.”
Id. at 285.
55 Compare id. at 281 (finding that the FFDC Act did not require awareness of some wrong-
doing in order to impose criminal sanctions), with id. at 292 (“[T]o apply the sanctions of
this Act to the respondent would be contrary to the intent of Congress as expressed in the
statutory language and in the legislative history.”).
56 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
57 See, e.g., BAKER ET AL., supra note 34, at 703 (providing an example of one such casebook).
58 Morissette, 342 U.S. at 263 (“We hold that the mere omission from [the statute] of any
mention of intent will not be construed as eliminating that element from the crimes
denounced.”).
59 See, e.g., MARSHALL, supra note 25, at 101 (stating that Justice Jackson’s opinion in
Morissette “defined the element of intent in our criminal law”).
60 Morissette, 342 U.S. at 260.
61 See id. at 260 (“[The Supreme Court has not] undertaken to delineate a precise line or
set forth comprehensive criteria for distinguishing between crimes that require a mental
element and crimes that do not.”).
62 See id. at 250.
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a matter of policy, does not specify intent as a necessary
element. The accused, if he does not will the violation, usu-
ally is in a position to prevent it with no more care than
society might reasonably expect and no more exertion
than it might reasonably exact from one who assumed his
responsibilities. . . . Under such considerations, courts have
turned to construing statutes and regulations which make
no mention of intent as dispensing with it and holding
that the guilty act alone makes out the crime.63
Thus, while approving the concept of strict liability crimes, Justice
Jackson’s opinion provides evidence that there are some limitations on
how and when they could be used.64
Similarly, in United States v. Freed, the Court found that strict lia-
bility was permissible with respect to the portion of the National Firearms
Act that made it illegal for a person “to receive or possess a firearm which
is not registered to him.”65 The Court noted that while some crimes have a
mens rea requirement, the National Firearms Act “is a regulatory measure
in the interest of the public safety, which may well be premised on the
theory that one would hardly be surprised to learn that possession of hand
grenades is not an innocent act.”66 Thus, as to the failure to register the
hand-grenades element of the crime,67 strict liability was appropriate.68
The “high water mark”69 for strict liability cases in the Supreme
Court was a bigamy case, Williams v. North Carolina.70 The Williams
defendants went to Nevada so that they could divorce their spouses,
then married each other and returned to North Carolina.71 They were
63 Id. at 256.
64 See Michaels, supra note 23, at 852 (stating that Morissette suggests the constitutional
limit on strict liability statutes, requiring that “there must be culpability regarding
elements that the legislature has the power to punish independently”).
65 401 U.S. 601, 607 (1971) (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1964 ed., Supp. V)).
66 Id. at 609.
67 See id. at 614 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that the crime at issue was comprised
of three elements: (1) possessing items that (2) were hand grenades, (3) that were
unregistered).
68 See Michaels, supra note 23, at 852 (“The legislature’s power to attach strict liability to
[the ‘failure to register’ element of the crime] is consistent with the principle of consti-
tutional innocence because the legislature could have punished the knowing possession
of all hand grenades.”).
69 See id. at 853.
70 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
71 Id. at 235.
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subsequently charged with, and convicted for, “bigamous cohabitation.”72
The North Carolina statute, under which the defendants were charged,
“imposed strict liability as to the element of ‘being married’ to the first
spouse.”73 The issue in the case was whether North Carolina’s failure to
recognize the Nevada divorces as valid violated the full faith and credit
clause of the Constitution.74 However, in dicta, the Supreme Court stated
that there was no merit to a failure of due process claim based upon the
strict liability component of the statute.75 On its face, this case seems to
violate the principle of constitutional innocence. But since the strict lia-
bility issue was not directly raised, the defendants fraudulently obtained
Nevada domicile to get their divorces, and the Supreme Court had not
yet established “the constitutional right to marry,” it would be unfounded
to take Williams as a “tacit rejection of constitutional innocence.”76
Next, in Lambert v. California, the Supreme Court overturned a
conviction based upon a Los Angeles statute that required convicted felons
that were going to be in Los Angeles for more than five days to register
with the Chief of Police.77 The defendant had been convicted of forgery and
wished to offer her lack of actual knowledge of the registration requirement
as a defense.78 The court held that
[w]here a person did not know of the duty to register
and where there was no proof of the probability of such
knowledge, he may not be convicted consistently with due
process. Were it otherwise, the evil would be as great as it
is when the law is written in print too fine to read or in a
language foreign to the community.79
Considered from a constitutional innocence perspective, Professor Michaels
argues that Lambert should be viewed as a “right to travel” case.80 He
72 Id.
73 See Michaels, supra note 23, at 853.
74 Williams, 325 U.S. at 227.
75 See id. at 238 (“Mistaken notions about one’s legal rights are not sufficient to bar pros-
ecution for crime.”).
76 See Michaels, supra note 23, at 855–56 (explaining that the constitutional right to marry
was established more than twenty years after the Williams decision); see also ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 644 (1997) (citing Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), as the Supreme Court’s first recognition of “the right to marry
as a fundamental right”).
77 355 U.S. 225, 226–27 (1957).
78 Id.
79 Id. at 229–30.
80 See Michaels, supra note 23, at 862.
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states that the intentional conduct to which the statute attached strict
liability in Lambert was not punishable by the legislature because of
Lambert’s constitutional right to travel.81 This distinguishes Lambert
from Balint and Dotterweich, where strict liability was constitutionally
permissible because the legislature had the power to punish the inten-
tional conduct, such as selling drugs, as proscribed by the applicable
statutes.82 This concept of constitutional innocence has been upheld in a
variety of settings—including freedom of speech,83 freedom of association,84
and abortion85—leading to findings that strict liability was unconstitu-
tional where “the other elements of the statute at issue [were] beyond the
legislative power to punish because of a fundamental right.”86
More recently, in Dean v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld
a provision in the U.S. Code that requires an increase in the mandatory
minimum sentence when a gun is discharged during a violent or drug
trafficking crime, regardless of whether the discharge was intentional or
accidental.87 Seven Justices supported the outcome of the case, with
Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer each issuing a dissent.88 For the
majority, Justice Roberts explained that, like the felony-murder rule,
intent was not a concern: “Here the defendant is already guilty of unlaw-
ful conduct twice over: a violent or drug trafficking offense and the use,
carrying, or possession of a firearm in the course of that offense. That
unlawful conduct was not an accident.”89
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150–52 (1959) (holding that a bookseller could not
be held criminally liable for possessing an obscene book without knowledge that the book
was obscene). The Smith Court stated that “the constitutional guarantees of the freedom
of speech and of the press stand in the way of imposing [strict liability components like
those that were upheld in Balint and Dotterweich] on the bookseller.” Id. at 152–53.
84 See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 498–99 (1951) (holding mere membership in
the Communist Party was not enough to establish criminal culpability and that conviction
would “require[ ] as an essential element of the crime proof of the intent of those who are
charged with its violation to overthrow the Government by force and violence”).
85 See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 396 (1979), overruled in part on other grounds
by Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (stating in dicta that a
statute imposing strict liability for inaccurately determining fetus viability could have a
“chilling effect” on doctors’ willingness to perform abortions); see also Planned Parenthood
v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452, 1464–65 (8th Cir. 1995) (striking down a statute that required
compliance with parental notice and informed consent laws prior to abortions because the
law applied strict liability on doctors with respect to compliance).
86 Michaels, supra note 23, at 866–76.
87 129 S. Ct. 1849, 1852, 1856 (2009).
88 See id. at 1851.
89 Id. at 1855.
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There was no argument from any of the Justices that the sentencing
increase could not stand without an intent requirement. Instead, Justice
Stevens argued simply that unless Congress shows clear intent to make
the provision a strict liability provision, the intent should be assumed as
an element of the offense.90 Similarly, Justice Breyer would have re-
quired intent to discharge the weapon because, despite strong arguments
from the majority, “the ‘rule of lenity’ tips the balance against the major-
ity’s position.”91 The rule of lenity, he explained, requires that a criminal
statute provide “fair warning” of how the law will operate if a specific
line is crossed.92
The United States Constitution thus provides limits on when
strict liability offenses are permissible, but the option of strict criminal
liability plainly remains an option for responding to environmental and
other disasters.93 As noted above, strict liability is not the norm, and often
the option is not to eliminate the mens rea requirement, per se, but to
increase liability by reducing the prosecutions burden of proof.
B. Disaster- and Tragedy-Related Increases in Liability
1. The Financial Sector
Seeking additional ways to punish perceived wrongdoers is a com-
mon disaster response, especially when there is a public perception that
those responsible for the harm went unpunished. This is not solely an envi-
ronmental law phenomenon. Aggressive responses have been commonplace
in the relatively recent past in the financial sector. In 2002, following cor-
porate scandals at Enron, Arthur Andersen, Tyco, Global Crossing, and
WorldCom, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act94 was signed into law.95 Many less
90 Id. at 1858–59 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Absent a clear indication that Congress intended
to create a strict liability enhancement, courts should presume that a provision that man-
dates enhanced criminal penalties requires proof of intent.”).
91 Id. at 1860 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
92 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971)).
93 See United States v. Mex. Feed & Seed Co., 980 F.2d 478, 479 (8th Cir. 1992) (discussing
strict liability under CERCLA).
94 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2002).
95 Catherine S. Neal, The Role of the Judiciary in Advancing Public Policy to Promote Ethical
Business Practices: Comparing Gray Market Tires to Tiffany Silver Jewelry, 19 KAN. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 171, 175 (2010).
14 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 36:1
than glowing reviews of the Act have followed,96 and the response appar-
ently did little to nothing to help avoid the financial collapse of 2008.97
Then, in response to the financial failures of 2008, the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Pub. L. 111-203, H.R.
4173) was signed into law in 2010.98 This law, too, represented an aggres-
sive move in response to the financial collapse, but there are serious ques-
tions as to whether Dodd-Frank addresses the root causes of the collapse,
and whether the law is capable of addressing the concerns that led to its
creation.99 Some have argued that statutes like this are necessary when the
financial sector has run amok, as was done with the New Deal legislation
that lead to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934.100 But, notwithstanding the longevity and prominence of these two
acts, there are still those who question whether fraud prevention was
achieved by these actions.101 Most certainly, fraud is far from eradicated.
2. The (Traditional) Criminal World
Such responses follow in more traditional criminal law settings, as
well. The recent high-profile acquittal of Casey Anthony provides a good
example. In 2008, Casey Anthony reported that her two-year-old daughter,
96 See, e.g., Craig S. Lerner & Moin A. Yahya, ‘Left Behind’ After Sarbanes-Oxley,
REGULATION, Fall 2007, at 44, 49 (“Sarbanes-Oxley has caused some ideal entrepreneurs
to flee American publicly traded corporations, either for the greener pastures of Europe or
private equity.”).
97 Amy Deen Westbrook, Sunlight on Iran: How Reductive Standards of Materiality Excuse
Incomplete Disclosure Under the Securities Laws, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L. J. 13, 72 (2011)
(“Despite these measures [including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act], accounting practices have
again come under fire with the recent financial crisis.”).
98 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
99 See Eric C. Chaffee, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: A
Failed Vision for Increasing Consumer Protection and Heightening Corporate Responsibility
in International Financial Transactions, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1431, 1436 (2011) (“[T]he Dodd-
Frank Act is largely a twentieth century approach to regulating twenty-first century fi-
nancial markets because it fails to adequately address the globalization of financial markets
that has occurred within the past few decades.”).
100 See George J. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 132, 132 (1973) (explaining that the
stock market crash was the primary motivation for the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
101 See, e.g., Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 1, 3–4.
2011] CHOOSING A BETTER PATH 15
Caylee, was missing and had been missing for thirty-one days, when in fact
it was later revealed that the child was dead.102 Several stories were put
forth as to what happened and how it might have happened.103 Ms. Anthony
was charged with murder for killing her daughter.104 Due to apparent evi-
dentiary concerns, the jury acquitted Ms. Anthony of those charges.105
In response to the verdict, a massive Internet campaign led to more
than 700,000 signatures in support of Caylee’s Law, a law that would make
it a felony if a parent or guardian failed to notify authorities within twenty-
four hours of a child’s death.106 Several states started drafting such a law,
with as many as sixteen others considering such legislation.107 The prob-
lem is that Caylee’s Law would have limited to no effect on protecting
children.108 There is no compelling argument that a felony failure-to-report
law would have any deterrent effect; after all, if a potential death sentence
for murder is not a deterrent, it makes little sense to expect that a lesser
jail sentence would have much impact.109 Further, such a law is in response
to an isolated occurrence and set of circumstances that is not likely to be
exactly replicated.110 That is, Caylee’s Law is designed to punish Casey
Anthony for what she did to Caylee. Of course, it will never serve that
purpose, thus creating a legislative version of “bad facts make bad law.”111
102 Bianca Prieto, Out But Not Free Anthony into Hiding, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Sydney, Austl.),
July 18, 2011, at 17.
103 See id.
104 See id.
105 See, e.g., Regina Brett, Jurors Do Thankless—and Vital—Work, PLAIN DEALER (Clev.),
July 14, 2011, at B1 (“Juror No. 11, the foreman who still wants to be anonymous, told the
media he wasn’t even sure a murder was committed.”).
106 See ‘Caylee’s Laws’ Are Proposed Across U.S., L.A. TIMES, July 10, 2011, at 17; see also
Jared Hunt, Lawmakers Consider ‘Caylee’s Law,’ CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL (W.V.) (Sept. 13),
2011, http://www.dailymail.com/News/statehouse/201109121878.
107 See ‘Caylee’s Laws’ Are Proposed, supra note 106.
108 Cf. id.
109 See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 614–15 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that it
is unclear if death sentences are, in fact, a deterrent).
110 See Missing Child Law Finds Big Support, THE GREENVILLE NEWS (Greenville, S.C.)
July 28, 2011 (discussing how legislative acts such as “Caylee’s Law” can be responses to
tragedies that “may or may not end up not being used”).
111 Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 659 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Haig v. Agee,
453 U.S. 280, 319 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S.Ct. 1187,
1217 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[T]ragic facts make bad law.”); Joshua Dunn, Note,
Justice for All (The Wrong Reasons): The Flaws and Fallout of Berman v. Sitrin, 16 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 305, 305 (2011) (quoting the previous cases).
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II. THE MIXED RESULTS OF INCREASED LIABILITY IN
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Laws too gentle are seldom obeyed; too severe, seldom
executed.112
As noted above, the use of strict liability in criminal law is not
the norm.113 Most statutes require some level of affirmative intent,
recklessness, or negligence before criminal liability attaches.114 As dis-
cussed above, when disastrous or tragic events occur, legislators and
regulators (usually at the behest of the public) often pursue options to
increase potential liability through regulation of an offense somehow
connected to the event.115 And where such crimes already exist, the like-
lihood that law enforcement will seek to prosecute using a strict liability
crime increases in the aftermath of a major disaster.116
Case in point: in the wake of the Exxon Valdez, the largest U.S. oil
spill prior to Deepwater Horizon,117 prosecutors pursued defendants under
two environmental laws that had been rarely, if ever, used in the context
of a marine oil spill.118 Prosecutors sought to use the strict criminal lia-
bility provisions of the Refuse Act119 and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act120
in their pursuit of convictions.121 These provisions were only misdemeanors,
112 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, POOR RICHARD’S ALMANACK 546 (J. A. Leo Lemay ed., Library
Classics of the United States 1997) (1756).
113 Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal
Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law,
93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 147 (2005) (“Strict liability, where the defendant need have no par-
ticularly blameworthy mental state, is rare and disfavored in criminal law.”).
114 See id.
115 See Adam Matthew Kay, Boardroom Roulette—A Reflective Look at International Goals,
Failures, Crises and Remedies in the Field of Corporate Governance, 19 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L.
449, 470 (2011) (“In the United States each crisis has been followed almost immediately
with some form of regulation.”).
116 Eric A. DeGroff, The Application of Strict Criminal Liability to Maritime Oil Pollution
Incidents: Is There OPA for the Accidental Spiller?, 50 LOY. L. REV. 827, 832 (2004)
(explaining that the government used aggressive and unique tactics to pursue Exxon
after the crash of the Valdez).
117 See Ronen Perry, The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and the Limits of Civil Liability,
86 WASH. L. REV. 1, 3 (2011).
118 DeGroff, supra note 116, at 830 (stating that the government used “two environmental
statutes of questionable relevance to marine oil pollution,” the Refuse Act and the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act).
119 Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2006).
120 Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–12 (2000 & Supp. III 2004).
121 DeGroff, supra note 116, at 830.
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as opposed to other felony charges, but the strict liability provisions were
instrumental in leading to a settlement with the government.122
Pursuing strict liability offenses or using tenuously connected
offenses to pursue convictions is creative law enforcement, and it may
increase punishment on wrongdoers, but it is not without risk. In 1996,
Professor Richard J. Lazarus explained, “Absent effective sanctions for
their violation, noncompliance with environmental requirements is re-
duced to merely a cost of doing business.”123 Adding a criminal component
to environmental law, he argued, can be used to help reinforce the impor-
tance of environmental protection and help promote changes in “social
attitudes.”124 The threat of incarceration, he further noted, “can prompt
far greater compliance by industry than mere civil sanctions.”125 This can
have a strong deterrent function, which is often a key component in envi-
ronmental law.126 This deterrent function is certainly one of the argu-
ments for strict liability against those responsible for disasters like the
Deepwater Horizon blowout.127
Still, Professor Lazarus warned that in pursuing strict criminal lia-
bility (or highly relaxed mens rea requirements) for violations of environ-
mental law, the rationale behind such law could be at risk.128 He explains,
“By failing to respect or even appearing to neglect [the legitimate scope of
environmental law], we risk no less than the erosion of the underlying sub-
stantive environmental protection standards themselves.”129 Thus, even
if strict criminal liability is permissible, there are substantial reasons to
tread lightly.
Furthermore, diluting mens rea requirements could have the
effect of increasing risk-taking by those charged with oversight of the very
122 Id. (“Though less serious in theory than the felony charges, the misdemeanor counts
under the Refuse Act and the MBTA greatly strengthened the government’s bargaining
position.”).
123 Richard J. Lazarus, Mens Rea in Environmental Criminal Law: Reading Supreme Court
Tea Leaves, 7 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 861, 865–66 (1996).
124 Id. at 865.
125 Id. at 866.
126 Id. at 866–67 (“Deterrence, therefore, can be essential to the achievement of the preven-
tive objective of environmental law to prevent such harms, rather than merely to redress
harms once they have occurred.”).
127 See Uhlmann, supra note 3, at 1450; Stephen Raucher, Raising the Stakes for
Environmental Polluters: The Exxon Valdez Criminal Prosecution, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 147,
181 (1992).
128 See Lazarus, supra note 123, at 880.
129 Id.
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activities that the laws were designed to make safer.130 The issue is that
those who are more likely to be risk averse to criminal sanctions will leave
the field altogether (to work in other less risky arenas), while leaving those
who are undeterred by the risk of jail time in positions of power (and po-
tentially greater positions of power).131 In fact, there may be some indi-
cation this is happening right now.
In July 2011, ConocoPhillips announced that it would be splitting
its company into two separate entities, one that explores for and produces
oil, and another that refines the oil.132 This followed the January 2011 move
by Marathon Oil to do the same thing.133 Marathon’s spin-off, Marathon
Petroleum Corp., which is the refining company, started trading July 1,
2011.134 On the one hand, separating these operations into separate compa-
nies could be a good thing. The executives of these entities will now have a
more focused business model, and the concerns of each part of the business
are now less likely to compete with one another.135 Further, the companies
may be better focused on their own expertise.
One might speculate that these companies are splitting to isolate
the risk of the extraction process; at least, that is part of the equation. On
the one hand, splitting the entity in two may be reasonable and sensible
business planning and risk management.136 By spinning off the exploration
company, the resulting refining company is giving up the opportunity to
participate in the upside of the spun off company, and is eliminating the
related risk. If the entity’s decision makers believe that is best, there is
little reason to question the decision on that basis.137
130 Cf. Lerner & Yahya, supra note 96, at 47 (stating that strict liability penalties could
increase risky behavior of executives for whom “criminal laws are just another cost of
doing business.”).
131 See id.
132 See Chris Kahn, Oil Giant ConocoPhillips To Split into 2 Companies, THE DENVER POST,
July 15, 2011 (quoting Oppenheimer & Co. analyst Fadel Gheit), available at http://www
.denverpost.com/business/ci_18480692 (“This is so positive for [ConocoPhillips]. Everyone
should stick to one business.”).
133 See id.
134 Id.
135 See Isabel Ordonez & Daniel Gilbert, ConocoPhillips Split in Two, WALL ST. J., (July 15,
2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303406104576445540310224276.html
(quoting chief executive of ConocoPhillips, James Mulva, as stating the split would help
each branch of the company compete with more ease).
136 See Kahn, supra note 132.
137 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance
Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1812 (2011) (“There is no more basic question in corpo-
rate governance than ‘who decides.’ . . . Corporate law generally adopts what I have called
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An inherent risk of this division, though, is that the resulting
exploration-and-extraction entity will take along with it executives and
other leaders who are not appropriately risk averse, and thus increase
the likelihood of disaster.138 This is not because executives or employees
who are in the exploration and extraction industry are generally unlaw-
ful or poor risk assessors. But, as the risk of punishment increases (and
inappropriately aggressive pursuit of criminal penalties increases) in the
industry, there is a parallel risk that executives who are appropriately
mindful of the law will be inclined to work in industries where an execu-
tive’s actions more likely control how and whether an executive will face
criminal sanctions.139
CONCLUSION: RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT AS ENVIRONMENTAL
AND ECONOMIC PROTECTION
The relentless pursuit of those who have caused pain and suffering
has real value, but the blind pursuit of laws that would have punished
those who are perceived to have done wrong in the past is a fundamentally
flawed pursuit. Of course, there are times when new laws and regulations
are necessary to handle new ways of perpetrating a fraud or to address new
information about what was previously viewed as acceptable conduct.140
But often, new laws and regulations are not a reaction to new information
or technology; they are a reaction to a unique and unfortunate set of facts
that is more likely related to timing or circumstances than an emerging
trend.141 Other times, it is a lack of enforcement of existing protections,
meaning the problem is not the law itself; it is the enforcement of the law
that is the problem.142
‘director primacy.’ It assigns decisionmaking to the board of directors or the managers
to whom the board has properly delegated authority.” (footnotes omitted)).
138 See Lerner & Yahya, supra note 96, at 47.
139 See id. at 48–49 (utilizing two case studies where individuals, despite lack of involve-
ment and best efforts at compliance were still strapped with prison sentences, begging
the question of whether executives truly have great control over criminal environmental
law violations).
140 The development of cybercrime laws is one example. See, e.g., MONIQUE HEBERT &
MARILYN PILON, LAW & GOV’T DIV., COMPUTER CRIME, DEPOSITORY SERVS. PROGRAM,
GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/bp87-e
.htm (last updated Oct. 24, 2002).
141 See, e.g., DeGroff, supra note 116, at 882 (noting that the Oil Pollution Act was a direct
result of the Exxon-Valdez spill).
142 Oliver A. Houck, Worst Case and the Deepwater Horizon Blowout: There Ought to Be
a Law, 24 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 16 (2010) (“Without the backup of NEPA, there was little
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A. Understanding and Embracing Inherent Risk
As such, rather than pursuing laws that reduce the mens rea
requirements, increase fines, or lengthen prison sentences, legislators and
regulators should be facilitating laws and rules that either directly increase
safety or that help entities (as well as their executives and shareholders)
assess their risk assessments. The first part of this involves a process
that requires the government and those advising the government to do a
better job of explaining and understanding risk.143 Energy exploration and
extraction is inherently risky.144 There is no way to completely avoid risk
in the same way that no surgery is without risk.145 There are ways to reduce
risk, but not ways to avoid it completely.
Unfortunately, this is not always appreciated by even those closest
to reviewing environmental disasters. The National Commission on the BP
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling’s co-chair, Bob Graham,
said, “The Commission’s findings only compound our sense of tragedy be-
cause we know now that the blowout of the Macondo well was avoidable.
This disaster likely would not have happened had the companies involved
been guided by an unrelenting commitment to safety first.”146 It is almost
certainly true that BP could have done much to help reduce the risk of the
blowout, and they did not.147 But to say that it was avoidable overstates
the ability of all involved to protect against accidents 5,000 feet below the
water.148 If those charged with reviewing how the disaster occurred, and
examination of the industry’s worst-case claims or the government approvals for
deepwater drilling.”).
143 See id. at 2, 12 (stating that the government and its advisors did not ever consider the
risk or possibility of a blowout when making their approvals).
144 See id. at 2.
145 See Hamish Stewart, The Limits of Consent and the Law of Assault, 24 CAN. J.L. &
JURIS. 205, 216 (2011) (“[I]n consenting to surgery for a therapeutic purpose, one consents
to an intentional wounding, with a consequent risk of death.”).
146 Press Release, Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore
Drilling, Commission Releases Chapter on BP Well Blowout Investigation in Advance of
Full Report (Jan. 5, 2011), http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/document/commission-releases
-chapter-bp-well-blowout-investigation-advance-full-report (follow “Download” hyperlink).
147 See, e.g., Russell Gold et al., Leaking Oil Well Lacked Safeguard Device, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 28, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704423504575212031417
936798.html; Ayesha Rascoe, BP Workers Could Have Prevented Rig Accident: Report,
REUTERS (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/17/us-oil-spill-causes
-idUSTRE71G5NN20110217.
148 Houck, supra note 142, at 2–3 (“Sea floor responses, when things go wrong, are described
as ‘open heart surgery at 5,000 feet in the dark.’ ”) (quoting Mike Soraghan, Industry Claims
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highly critical of BP, are missing that point, it is hardly shocking that BP
missed it, too.149
Quite simply, the financial incentives to put BP on a risk mitigation
path were already in place, even if the regulatory oversight was lax. As
noted above, the Deepwater Horizon disaster in the Gulf of Mexico released
4.9 million barrels (205.8 million gallons) of oil into the Gulf.150 In addition
to approximately $20 billion in cleanup and spill-related claims, BP lost
nearly half a trillion dollars in oil into the Gulf.151 And BP is not the only
company to suffer a big spill-related oil loss. A second, smaller spill oc-
curred in 2010 when Enbridge Inc.’s oil pipeline dumped more than 800,000
gallons of oil into the state of Michigan’s Kalamazoo River.152 That is
more than 19,000 barrels of oil, a loss of about $2 million in oil.153 Shortly
after the spill, Enbridge announced that the cleanup would cost about
$550 million.154
It is hard to imagine that anyone at these companies wanted any-
thing like this to happen, but the spills still occurred. The lost oil, plus the
necessary (and far more expensive) costs of remediation, should have led
companies to work diligently for safer and more reliable operation, but
other pressures got in the way. As it turns out, people are generally very
bad risk assessors and risk managers, even when they are highly edu-
cated and highly sophisticated.155 This is true far beyond the oil industry.
For example, almost every spring, the flood waters rise in the
Northern Plains, yet major areas lack significant and permanent flood-
avoidance measures.156 Fargo, North Dakota and the rest of the area work
of ‘Proven’ Technology Went Unchallenged at MMS, GREENWIRE, June 2, 2010, http://
www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2010/06/02/1).
149 Cf. Hari M. Osofsky, Multidimensional Governance and the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1077 (2011) (“[T]he cleanup, like the regulatory process that preceded
the spill, was complicated by blurry public-private relationships that constrained the
government’s ability to minimize risk and respond.”).
150 See MABUS, supra note 1, at 2.
151 See Ken Wells, The Tort Lawyer and the BP Oil Disaster, BUSINESSWEEK, May 27, 2010,
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_23/b4181066654108.htm.
152 Oil Spill Cleanup Continues a Year Later, DET. NEWS, July 23, 2011, at A1.
153 See id.; see also What’s in a Barrel of Oil?, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, http://energyalmanac
.ca.gov/gasoline/whats_in_barrel_oil.html (last updated Sept. 28, 2011) (noting that there
are 42 gallons of oil in one barrel).
154 Id.
155 See Krista Boryskavich, The Role of Consumer Preference in the Regulation of Genetically
Modified Organisms, 5 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 1, 15 (2005) (considering risk
assessment in the context of genetically modified organisms).
156 See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, A HISTORY OF FLOODING IN
THE RED RIVER BASIN (2007), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/gip/2007/55/pdf /finalWeb
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diligently each year to prepare for potentially disastrous flooding by sand-
bagging the area.157 Until recently, a dike system was not seriously part
of the discussion, even though the potential risk of loss is well known.158
Citizens of Fargo areas have seen the dangers of such floods when
a city lacks adequate protection. In 1997, in Grand Forks, North Dakota
(eighty miles to the north), flooding and a related fire led to $4 billion in
losses and a $400 million dike system to protect the city from similar fu-
ture events.159 More recently, the entire nation witnessed the impact of
Hurricane Katrina, and the resulting flooding, on New Orleans, which
was even larger: $100 billion lost ($40 billion of which was private).160
Arguably, the present value cost of flood protection in New Orleans was
about $1.5 billion.161 Thus, in both circumstances, the cost of prevention
was far cheaper than the cost of repair. And in both cases, the cost of pre-
vention was incurred (or should be) along with the costs of rebuilding and
repairing the area.162
Risk management, obviously, can be done well. For example, in
Winnipeg, Canada, a floodway was completed in 1968 to protect the city
from flooding of the Red River, which is the same north-running river
that flooded Grand Forks and threatens Fargo each spring.163 Known as
Duff ’s Ditch and Duff ’s Folly, after its chief proponent, Manitoba Premier
Duff Roblin, the diversion system cost $63 million, approximately $300–
$900 million today.164 In the years since its construction, “Duff ’s Folly” has
saved billions of dollars, not to mention the human and social costs that
attach to such traumatic events.165
GIP55.pdf (providing a time line of major floods in the northern plains up until 2006); A
River Runs Through It, Again, ECONOMIST, Apr. 4, 2009, at 39.
157 Id.
158 See Ken Thomas, North Dakota and Minnesota Officials Discuss Flood Preparations,
BISMARCK TRIB. (May 5, 2009), http://www.bismarcktribune.com/news/state-andregional
/article_eee242a1-2f61-5c39-acac-01cf88684065.html (discussing a new flood defense system
for the Red River Basin).
159 See Joshua P. Fershee, The Rising Tide of Climate Change: What America’s Flood Cities
Can Teach Us About Energy Policy and Why We Should Be Worried, 39 ENVTL. L. 1109,
1117, 1122 (2009).
160 Id. at 1125.
161 Id. at 1126.
162 See id. at 1131 (explaining what can be learned from Grand Forks).
163 Id. at 1121.
164 Id.
165 See Fershee, supra note 159, at 1121.
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B. A Modest Beginning: Next Steps to Safer Energy Policy
So what can be done to help companies do a better job of risk assess-
ment and risk management? There are myriad options, and books and dis-
sertations on the subject only graze the surface of the possibilities. A full
assessment of the options and the likelihood of success are well beyond the
scope of this Article. However, there are three comparatively modest sug-
gestions that could help in the process. First, legislators and regulators can
craft laws and rules in ways that better explain the legal landscape,
which will, in turn, help those managers explain the need to take steps
(and spend money) to their boards of directors, shareholders, and other
stakeholders. Second, we all need to be more pragmatic. We need to ac-
knowledge the risks of fulfilling our need for oil, and we need to focus
more on options that lead directly to safer operations rather than in-
crease penalties. Finally, lawyers, as advisors to companies, can do a
better job of assessing and explaining risk to help companies pursue
their bottom-line goals effectively.
1. Sending the Right Messages
Legislators and regulators can help send companies the right mes-
sage by crafting laws and rules in ways that explain clearly what is expect-
ed of those companies and how potential liability will be assessed. Norway
is often held out as an example of a country that has stronger environmen-
tal laws in place for its massive oil program.166 It may seem like an unfair
comparison, because Norway’s government is socialist,167 but in the offshore
drilling context, the relationship between government and the oil company
is substantially similar in the United States and Norway.
In Norway, the state owns all the offshore mineral rights: “The
Norwegian State has the proprietary right to subsea petroleum deposits
and the exclusive right to resource management.”168 In contrast to most
166 See UNITED NATIONS ENVTL. PROGRAMME, Environmental Regulations for Norwegian
Offshore Oil & Gas Industry, OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS ENVIRONMENT FORUM, http://www
.oilandgasforum.net/management/regula/norwayprof.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2011).
167 See Landon Thomas Jr., Thriving Norway Provides Economic Lesson, N.Y. TIMES,
May 13, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/14/business/global/14frugal.html?_r=2&
em; Bureau of European & Eurasian Affairs, Background Note: Norway, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE (July 18, 2011), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3421.htm (discussing the coalition
between the socialist left party and labor party in the 2005 election).
168 Petroleum Activities Act (1996) § 1-1 (Nor.).
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of the world, privately owned land means privately owned mineral rights
in the United States.169 Deepwater drilling, however, is on the Outer
Continental Shelf, which means the right to drill is leased by companies
from the federal government, with the companies paying the U.S. govern-
ment a royalty.170 Thus, the relationship between the government and the
oil company is functionally similar in these cases for the United States
and Norway.
A comparison of the U.S. Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA ’90”) and
Norway’s Petroleum Activities Act is thus helpful to illustrate how proper
framing of liability could assist company managers. OPA ’90, as was widely
publicized at the time of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, starts with a
small amount of liability: the “general rule” provides for a $75 million lia-
bility limit.171 However, despite this seemingly minuscule liability cap, OPA
’90 also includes an enormous exception. Specifically, the liability limit
does not apply if the incident was proximately caused by—
(A) gross negligence or willful misconduct of, or
(B) the violation of an applicable Federal safety, construc-
tion, or operating regulation by, the responsible party, an
agent or employee of the responsible party, or a person
acting pursuant to a contractual relationship with the re-
sponsible party (except where the sole contractual arrange-
ment arises in connection with carriage by a common carrier
by rail).172
In contrast, Norway’s liability law begins large, then tapers under appro-
priate circumstances. The Petroleum Activities Act provides: “The licensee
is liable for pollution damage without regard to fault.”173 Norway’s law
begins with vast, unlimited liability, and then narrows.174 The Petroleum
Activities Act continues:
If it is demonstrated that an inevitable event of nature, act
of war, exercise of public authority or a similar force ma-
jeure event has contributed to a considerable degree to the
169 See Victor B. Flatt, Paving the Legal Path for Carbon Sequestration from Coal, 19 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 211, 230 (2009).
170 See LITA EPSTEIN ET AL., THE COMPLETE IDIOT’S GUIDE TO THE POLITICS OF OIL 199–
201 (2003).
171 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2704 (2006).
172 Id.
173 Petroleum Activities Act (1996) § 7-3 (Nor.).
174 See id.
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damage or its extent under circumstances which are beyond
the control of the liable party, the liability may be reduced
to the extent it is reasonable, with particular consideration
to the scope of the activity, the situation of the party that
has sustained damage and the opportunity for taking out
insurance on both sides.175
Admittedly, the structure of this law grants Norway the power to enforce
strict civil liability in any case, then allows the company to demonstrate
why that should not be the case.176 Functionally, though, where a company
covered by OPA ’90 violates, for example, a safety regulation, the result is
the same, unlimited liability.177 The overall structure of Norway’s law is
preferable to its U.S. counterpart, even if the U.S. law were to retain a cap
in some circumstances, because beginning with an expectation of unlimited
liability helps people understand the full scope of the potential risk.178 It
grabs their attention, and may help them focus on what can be done to
reduce that risk. It may be small, but low-cost framing mechanisms that
focus attention on ways to reduce the risk of harm are an improvement.
2. The Link Between Pragmatism and Safety
[P]ragmatism has the potential to furnish a durable and
useful set of intellectual tools for analyzing knotty environ-
mental policy issues.179
Lawmakers and regulators need to embrace a pragmatic view of oil
industry oversight. This means enacting laws that work to maximize safety
and recognize that sometimes simple gestures can facilitate improved com-
pany policies.180 For example, when oil was spilling into the Gulf from the
Macondo well, there was some question about the potential liability that
175 Id.
176 See id.
177 See Oil Pollution Act of 1990 § 2704.
178 See Key Senators Call for Lifting of Oil Liability Caps, CNN (June 8, 2010), http://
articles.cnn.com/2010-06-08/politics/oil.spill.liability_1_gulf-spill-oil-pollution-act/2?_s
=PM:POLITICS (quoting White House Spokesman Ben Labolt) (“Oil companies should
have every incentive to maximize safety, and arbitrary caps on liability create a disin-
centive to achieve that goal.”).
179 Joel A. Mintz, Some Thoughts on the Merits of Pragmatism as a Guide to Environmental
Protection, 31 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 25–26 (2004).
180 See Key Senators, supra note 178.
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might be incurred by other oil companies if they came to assist in the miti-
gation efforts.181 Norway, in comparison, protects Good Samaritans in some
circumstances. Section 7-4 of the Petroleum Activities Act states:
Liability for pollution damage cannot be claimed against: . . .
c) anyone who undertakes measures to avert or limit pol-
lution damage, or to save life or rescue values which have
been endangered in connection with the petroleum activi-
ties, unless the measures are performed in conflict with
prohibitions imposed by public authorities or are per-
formed by someone other than public authorities in spite
of express prohibition by the operator or the owner of the
values threatened.182
Similarly, Norway requires that all who work on an oil drilling project
“shall at all times maintain efficient emergency preparedness with a
view to dealing with accidents and emergencies which may lead to loss
of lives or personal injuries, pollution or major damage to property.”183
Although emergency preparedness may seem obvious, there were serious
questions about BP’s preparation and analysis of the potential for a
blowout.184 There are some requirements in U.S. regulations that de-
mand analysis of a possible blowout, but these regulations have not been
effectively implemented.185
Lastly, Norway provides that all facilities must have an “emergency
shutdown system” capable of preventing hazard development, “accident
situations and limit[ing] the consequences of accidents.”186 The law also
181 Joel Kurtzman, Viewpoint: The Oil Spill: Where Are the Good Samaritans?, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (June 22, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/managing/content/jun2010
/ca20100621_358809.htm (“Liability issues surrounding the spill are affecting the cleanup
[because] . . . companies and nonprofits with technical expertise, which might be able to
help, lack legal resources or protection and are wary of wandering into what is sure to
be a legal equivalent of a 100-mile slick.”).
182 Petroleum Activities Act (1996) § 7-4 (Nor.).
183 Id. at § 9-2. The law also provides: “The licensee shall see to it that necessary measures
are taken to prevent or reduce harmful effects, including the measures required in order, to
the extent possible, to return the environment to the condition it had before the accident
occurred.” Id.
184 See Houck, supra note 142, at 9–11.
185 See id. (demonstrating how the enforcement of such regulations was inadequate in the
case of BP and other Western Gulf explorations).
186 PETROLEUM SAFETY AUTH., GUIDELINES REGARDING THE FACILITIES REGULATIONS,
REGULATIONS RELATING TO TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL MATTERS AT OFFSHORE
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requires: “It shall be possible to manually activate functions from the cen-
tral control room that bring the onshore facility to a safe condition in the
event of a fault in the parts of the system that can be programmed.”187
Norway and Brazil both require the use of acoustic switches that can ac-
tivate a blowout preventer remotely.188 The United States and the United
Kingdom do not.189
Although it is not clear that such a device would have worked to
avoid the Deepwater Horizon disaster, it would have provided another
option to try.190 Rather than adding criminal penalties for executives and
other company employees without regard to intent, lawmakers and regu-
lators would be better served focusing on efforts that have at least the
potential to directly address or avert the disaster.
3. Lawyers Can Do Better
Lawyers, especially in a non-litigation context, need to help their
clients assess risk and solve problems. That means lawyers cannot spend
all their time saying no. Instead, it means lawyers must spend time learn-
ing their clients’ businesses and understanding what their clients need.
Only then can an effective lawyer begin providing effective options and
solutions. Of course, some things are simply illegal or unsafe; that is when
a lawyer should and must say no. But, for the most part, it is not a question
of whether the clients can do something. It is whether it is worth the risk,
financial or otherwise.
Managers must deal with risks in a variety of ways. As Robert Eli
Rosen explained in his dissertation, Lawyers in Corporate Decision-Making:
a manager’s job is “balancing risks, developing a risk-portfolio, [and] secur-
ing support from others to minimize risks.”191 Part of the problem may be
that lawyers are failing their client managers. As Rosen explains:
The lesson to be learned in the risk analysis approach is
that the lawyer must approach managers in a constructive
fashion to effectively serve the corporation. The lawyer must
FACILITIES IN THE PETROLEUM ACTIVITIES, ETC. § 33 (Nor.), available at http://www.ptil
.no/facilities/category400.html#_Toc280616950.
187 Id.
188 Russell Gold et al., supra note 147.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 ROBERT ELI ROSEN, LAWYERS IN CORPORATE DECISION-MAKING 96 (2010).
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approach the manager from the position of helping the man-
ager realize his objectives. If the lawyer doesn’t adopt this
stance, the client will not consult him and will find ways to
circumvent him.192
It is the lawyer’s job to help the manager, and if lawyers are not pursuing
solutions for their clients and presenting the options in useful ways, the
manager will work around their counsel. When something bad happens,
the initial fault resides with the manager making poor choices. However,
lawyers must take their charge seriously, or they must share some of the
responsibility.
C. A Shared Responsibility
As energy prices remain high, the U.S. economy benefits from its
energy-related industries. States like North Dakota193 and West Virginia194
have remained financially healthier than much of the country, in large part
because of their energy resources. Across much of the country, energy in-
dustries have helped mitigate the difficult financial times.195 As Louisiana
and Texas experienced after the blowout of the Macondo well, an environ-
mental disaster can have long-lasting effects that are broader than the
disaster itself.196 The lingering moratorium on drilling in the Gulf in the
wake of the accident has had additional severe consequences.197
One of the greatest risks to the continued economic success of
energy-related activities is an environmental disaster. As such, disaster
avoidance is a benefit to all stakeholders: lawmakers, regulators, oil
192 Id. at 115.
193 See Amy Merrick, In North Dakota, the Good Times Roll, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2009, at A4.
194 See AMY HIGGINBOTHAM ET AL., W. VA. UNIV., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE NATURAL
GAS INDUSTRY AND THE MARCELLUS SHALE DEVELOPMENT IN WEST VIRGINIA IN 2009, 1
(2010) (“The economic impact of the Marcellus Shale development in the state in 2009
was calculated to be $2.35 billion of business volume and accounted for the generation
of 7,600 jobs.”).
195 See id.; Merrick, supra note 193, at A4.
196 See David Biello, One Year After BP Oil Spill, At least 1.1 Million Barrels Still Missing,
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Apr. 25, 2011), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm
?id=one-year-after-bp-oil-spill-millions-of-barrels-oil-missing; Melissa Gaskill, Editorial,
The Pain of the Spill, TEX. PARKS & WILDLIFE (Dec. 2010), http://www.tpwmagazine.com
/archive/2010/dec/ed_1/.
197 See Maria Recio, Pressure Builds to Expand Drilling A Year After BP Oil Spill, PITT.
POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 24, 2011, at A11.
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companies, and people generally have reason to support a safer energy
industry. The first step, then, is to adopt a proper mindset to help avoid
disasters. Rather than pursuing with vigor penalties to punish a future
perpetrator or seeking creative ways to use obscure laws that have a slight
chance of success, efforts should look to ways to prevent the next disaster.
This means carefully assessing risk, then developing plans and
programs to minimize that risk. This is not something that can happen
in a vacuum. It requires coordinated efforts from industry, government,
and the public. We all must understand and appreciate the risks before
us, then be prepared to accept the costs of our decisions.
